Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public Officials, Social Networking, and the Unmapped New Public Square by Sherman, Bill
Pace Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 1 Social Networking and the Law
Winter 2011
Article 3
January 2011
Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public Officials, Social
Networking, and the Unmapped New Public
Square
Bill Sherman
Sherman Law Firm
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bill Sherman, Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public Officials, Social Networking, and the Unmapped New
Public Square, 31 Pace L. Rev. 95 (2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/3
 95 
Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public 
Officials, Social Networking, and 
the Unmapped New Public Square 
 
Bill Sherman* 
 
Introduction 
 
Your City Councilmember wants to connect with you. She 
wants to hear from you, speak to you, allow you to get to know 
her, and get to know you. She wants to learn your concerns and 
interests, and discuss policy, politics, and issues big and small. 
It is fair to say that she wants to develop a relationship with 
you—one in which you share family photos, thoughts about 
movies and the weather, and, of course, your views on issues 
that will come before the City Council. In short, she wants to be 
friends. But some local governments say she cannot—at least 
not on Facebook. 
It turns out that there are friends, and there are “friends.” 
The use of online social networks by local public officials has 
drawn the ire of local governments, some of whom have gone so 
far as to bar public officials from social networks for fear of 
violating campaign finance, open meeting, freedom of 
information, and government ethics laws. These objections 
overlook the unique nature of civic social networks as an 
emerging political institution, characterized by a high degree of 
transparency and intense public pressure for accountability. 
The nature of this new institution renders the alarmist 
reaction overblown. Civic social networks are the new public 
square, and local governments should embrace them as 
 
* Attorney, The Sherman Law Firm, PLLC. B.A., Wesleyan University; 
J.D., University of Michigan. The author is a Commissioner on the City of 
Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission, the agency that administers and 
enforces the City‟s code covering Ethics, Elections, Whistleblower Protection, 
and Lobbying. This Article reflects only the views of the author, and not those 
of the Commission or the City of Seattle. © 2010 by Bill Sherman. 
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consistent with the goals of open government and ethics laws. 
This Article seeks to describe this emerging institutional 
environment, and by doing so help change the ways that 
policymakers apply open government and ethics rules to civic 
social networks. Part One identifies the ways local public 
officials and their constituents are using social networks. Part 
Two discusses the attempts by some local governments to 
eliminate or limit that use. Part Three uses public choice 
theory and rational choice institutionalism to assess the tools 
and behaviors that have given us the emerging institution of 
civic social networks—an institution characterized by high 
demand for transparency and accountability. Part Four argues 
that the nature of the institution described in Part Three 
demonstrates that the threatened enforcement of open 
government and ethics laws would have a perverse effect—
reducing transparency and accountability while exposing 
public officials to greater moral hazard. The Article concludes 
with recommendations for open government and ethics statutes 
(or the enforcement thereof) that would allow officials to 
engage their constituents in the new public square of civic 
social networks. 
 
I. Welcome to the New Public Square 
 
Local public officials are stampeding to use online social 
networks. It should come as no surprise that people whose lives 
are organized around constituent contact are adopting new 
tools that let them reach large numbers of people at little cost. 
But this scramble goes far beyond the use of formal, 
government-created websites with press releases, updates, and 
photos; today, it seems that there is hardly a mayor or city 
councilmember in a major American city without a Facebook 
page, a Twitter account, and a blog.1 Major policy 
 
1. Of course, Facebook can be found at www.facebook.com; Twitter at 
www.twitter.com; a “blog,” as surely everyone reading this Article knows, is a 
contraction of the term “web log,” and can be hosted at any number of web 
service companies, notably www.blogger.com. I will not attempt to offer a 
comprehensive definition of online social media. For a superb and detailed 
explanation of online social media, see James Grimmelmann, Saving 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/3
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announcements are made by tweet and entire town hall 
meetings happen in chat rooms.2 But most interestingly, local 
public officials have started using social networking in order to 
connect with their constituents, creating a three-way 
information flow: from official to constituent; from constituent 
to official; and among constituents, but in the context of the 
public official‟s network.3 
This Part seeks to describe the use of online social 
networks by public officials—civic social networks. It develops 
the contrast between the network use envisioned by the 
network enthusiasts and the local governments tasked with 
enforcing open meeting, freedom of information, campaign 
finance, and ethics laws, some of whom propose prohibiting or 
limiting civic social network. 
 
A. Civic Social Networks: Optimists, Visionaries, and the 
Promise of the New Public Square 
 
Enthusiasts envision the Internet as the great 
 
Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1142-48 (2009). As I comment, infra, the 
pace of change in social media is such that the specific platforms may be 
quite unrecognizable in just a few years. See, e.g., Today Now!: Internet 
Archeologists Find Ruins of “Friendster” Civilization, THE ONION NEWS 
NETWORK (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.theonion.com/video/internet-
archaeologists-find-ruins-of-friendster-c,14389/. 
2. Bill Dries, Wharton Vows Overhaul for Fleet Services, MEMPHIS DAILY 
NEWS (July 1, 2010), 
http://www.memphisdailynews.com/editorial/Article.aspx?id=51046 
(describing Memphis Mayor A.C. Wharton Jr.‟s first virtual town hall 
meeting); Keith Ervin, King County Budget Shortfall Rises to $90 million, 
THE SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 5, 2008), 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008160413_webkingbudget
05m.html (“[King County Executive Ron] Sims chose an unusual place to 
release the news, through Twitter, an online social-networking service that 
allows people to instantly post short messages in blog style.”); Michael Ray, 
The Virtual World of Online Gaming, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ALMANAC 
2008, at 8 (2008) (describing former Virginia Governor Mark Warner‟s virtual 
town hall meeting on the social network platform Second Life in 2006). 
3. This Article focuses on local public officials, a term meant to 
encompass elected officials such as city council members, and also broad 
enough to include appointed but still prominent local officials (for example, a 
police chief or head of a major city department). I do not include in my 
analysis candidates for public office, unless they are incumbents. 
3
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democratizer—a place with free commerce in opinions and 
ideas, where everyone is welcome, and where people gather to 
hear announcements, to protest, or to celebrate. In this 
optimistic conception, civic social networks are each 
community‟s new public square.4 
A physical public square is a common feature in a 
community; in a city like Washington, D.C., it might be the 
National Mall, and in a smaller town, it might be the village 
square or the steps of city hall. Just as the physical public 
square is many things—the locus of the distribution of official 
information, part tribune and part question time, a place to 
exchange information and news (and, yes, gossip, innuendo, 
and misinformation), and a place where one is exposed to new 
information—the new public square of civic social networks lets 
anyone in. Public officials in the physical public square may 
communicate with constituents or with each other, but such 
communication occurs in full public view where it may be 
interrupted, corrected, or seconded by an observing public; just 
as in the new public square of civic social networks. 
Social network sites have developed characteristics distinct 
from the Internet at large. Danah Boyd and Nicole Ellison 
define social network sites as “web-based services that allow 
individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile 
within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users 
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse 
their list of connections and those made by others within the 
system.”5 The elegance of this definition lies in the 
corresponding three types of social interactions that social 
networks enable: the creation of an online identity; the 
establishment of relationships between users; and the 
development of layered communities defined by the lists of 
 
4. Andrew Chadwick, Web 2.0: New Challenges for the Study of E-
Democracy in an Era of Informational Exuberance, 5 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR 
INFO. SOC'Y 9, 15 (2009) (noting that it was assumed in the 1990s that 
discussion forums “would provide for rich, critical, self-reflective, tolerant, 
and sustained citizen engagement, elegantly expressed through the medium 
of the written word”). 
5. Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, 
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMC‟N 210, 211 
(2007). 
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connections each user establishes.6 
The importance of these three types of interactions is the 
story of the commercial Internet for the last ten years. But they 
are equally important to politics and governance.7 Public 
officials craft an online identity in order to provide certain 
information or convey a certain brand or persona; constituents 
do the same thing, although their primary target audience in 
creating their online identity is more likely to be other 
constituents, rather than the public official. Public officials and 
constituents establish relationships among each other, and the 
communities defined by lists of those relationships have both 
direct communicative value (the ability to send and receive 
content to/from the list) and secondary communicative value 
(the ability to convey the size, content, level, and type of 
activity of a network).8 
At heart is a recognition that, as Justice Kennedy wrote, 
“Minds are not changed in streets and parks as they once were. 
To an increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of 
ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in mass and 
electronic media.”9 This is borne out by empirical evidence 
suggesting that online discourse has, in some ways, replaced 
the old public square.10 Thus, it is up to the states and 
 
6. See Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 1151-59 (analyzing in great detail 
this tripartite aspect of social networks). 
7. Chadwick, supra note 4, at 19 (citing Tim O‟Reilly, What is Web 2.0? 
Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of Software, 
O‟REILLY (Oct. 30, 2005), http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-
20.html). Among the many discussion of social media or “Web 2.0” in the 
political context is Tim O‟Reilly‟s definition of the term “Web 2.0,” with seven 
principles: the Internet as a platform for political discourse; the collective 
intelligence emergent from political web use; the importance of data over 
particular software and hardware applications; perpetual experimentalism in 
the public domain; the creation of small scale forms of political engagement 
through consumerism; the propagation of political content over multiple 
applications; and rich user experiences on political websites. Id. 
8. As Chadwick notes, “it seems safe to suggest that web 2.0 rests in part 
upon a broadly voluntarist model of knowledge creation.” Id. at 21. 
9. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727, 802-03 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. United 
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
10. Optimists believe that use of civic social networks is linked to 
5
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municipalities to conclude that, as Cass Sunstein puts it, “a 
free society requires a right of access to areas where many 
people meet.”11 
 
B. The Realists: Online Political Communication Ranges from 
Discourse to Dysfunction 
 
Civic social networks, one should not be surprised to 
notice, do not look like an Athenian polis with Wi-Fi. But local 
public officials and their constituents are flocking to social 
networking tools,12 and even government agencies that recently 
resisted have succumbed.13 The most popular tools appear to be 
Facebook,14 Twitter,15 and blogs16 (some hosted by a third-party 
 
greater civic engagement. KAREN MOSSBERGER, ET AL., DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP: 
THE INTERNET, SOCIETY, AND PARTICIPATION (2007) (finding that chat rooms, 
political email correspondence, and online news exposure predict higher 
voting rates); John Brehm & Wendy Rahn, Individual-Level Evidence for the 
Causes and Consequences of Social Capital, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 999 (1997); M. 
Kent Jennings & Laura Stoker, Social Trust and Civic Engagement Across 
Time and Generations, 39 ACTA POLITICA 342 (2004) (finding that political 
engagement is linked, in part, to a structure that encourages group 
membership, which in turn encourages trust). 
11. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 25 (2007). 
12. Carl E. Brody, Jr., Catch the Tiger by the Tail: Counseling the 
Burgeoning Government Use of Internet Media, 84 FLA. BAR J. 52 (2009), 
available at http://www.floridabar.org (“[L]ocal governments are beginning to 
take advantage of the benefits of social networking.”); see generally Aaron 
Smith, Government Online: The Internet Gives Citizens New Paths to 
Government Services and Information, PEW INTERNET (Apr. 27, 2010), 
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Government_Online_
2010_with_topline.pdf [hereinafter Government Online]. 
13. For example, last July, a Naples News story quoted a City of Marco 
Island public information coordinator, Lisa Douglass, saying that the City 
doesn‟t currently have any accounts with Websites, such as Facebook, and “I 
don‟t foresee us having any in the future either.” Kelly Farrell, Attorneys, 
Legislators to Pull Plug on Marco Government’s Use of Social Websites?, 
NAPLES NEWS (July 7, 2009), 
http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2009/jul/07/attorneys-legislators-pull-plug-
marco-governments-/; Cf. City of Marco Island Parks and Recreation, 
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Marco-Island-FL/City-of-Marco-
Island-Parks-and-Recreation/107921405922054 (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). 
14. See, e.g., Houston Mayor Annise Parker, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/MayorAnniseParker (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); 
Seattle Mayor Michael McGinn, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/michaelpatrickmcginn (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/3
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service like Blogger, and some hosted directly from government 
servers). 
To be sure, many posts from public officials read like very 
brief press releases: merely a pronouncement with little 
genuine interaction between the official and the public.17 But 
not all of them. In the snowstorm of 2010, Newark, New Jersey 
Mayor Cory Booker famously responded to a tweet requesting 
help removing snow by showing up with shovel in hand and 
volunteers in tow.18 Booker, a mayor of a city with less than 
300,000 residents, has more than 1,000,000 followers on 
Twitter.19 The New York City Council‟s Twitter account 
includes links to social networking posts by various 
councilmembers and other City agencies and general news.20 
 
San Antonio Mayor Julián Castro, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/MayorJulianCastro (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). 
15. See, e.g., Los Angeles Mayor Villaraigosa, TWITTER, 
http://twitter.com/VILLARAIGOSA (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Chicago 
Mayor Richard Daley, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/MayorDaley (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2010); Portland Mayor Sam Adams, TWITTER, 
http://twitter.com/MayorSamadams (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). 
16. See, e.g., Gary Newsom, SAN FRANCISCO MAYOR GAVIN NEWSOM‟S 
BLOG, http://sfmayor.typepad.com/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); Manny Diaz, 
MAYOR‟S BLOG, http://mayormannydiaz.blogspot.com/ (last visited Nov. 11, 
2010); R.T. Rybak, THE MAYOR BLOG, http://themayorblog.com/ (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2010); Dave Cieslewicz, MAYOR DAVE‟S BLOG, 
http://www.cityofmadison.com/mayor/blog/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2010); 
Antonio Villaraigosa, THE BLOG, 
http://mayor.lacity.org/MeettheMayor/TheBlog/index.htm (last visited Nov. 
11, 2010). 
17. See, e.g., Antonia Villaraigosa, TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2010, 2:13 PM), 
http://twitter.com/villaraigosa/status/21088633466 (“It was an honor to share 
successful anti-gang strategies w the first black Prime Minister of Belize. LA 
has a big Belizean population!”). Chicago Mayor Richard Daley now has a 
Twitter account, available at http://twitter.com/MayorDaley, although 
apparently he does not yet use email. Marcus Gilmer, Mayor Daley A-Twitter, 
CHICAGOIST.COM (Mar. 16, 2005, 11:15 AM), 
http://chicagoist.com/2010/03/16/mayor_daley_a-twitter.php. 
18. Eric Kuhn, Mayor Digs in After Twitter Appeal, CNN POLITICS 
(January 3, 2010), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/01/03/mayor-digs-
in-after-twitter-appeal/. 
19. Cory Booker, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/corybooker (last visited Oct. 
14, 2010). 
20. NYC Council, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/nyccouncil (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2010). 
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Houston Mayor Annise Parker‟s Facebook page includes 
comment threads by constituents on subjects before the City, 
and some replies by Mayor Parker (or her staff).21 
In addition to specific city officials, some cities‟ agencies or 
departments have aggressively adopted social media. The City 
of Chicago lists 33 different social media accounts for its 
agencies—not including any for City public officials other than 
the mayor.22 In some cases, social media chases the officials 
rather than the other way around. For example, British activist 
volunteer group MySociety created websites, including 
TheyWorkForYou and FixMyStreet that, like open source 
maps, mashup government data with user-generated input to 
connect constituents with problems, information, or interests to 
each other and to public officials.23 
So even if idealists hoping that social networks would 
enable a high-minded process of deliberative democracy are 
likely to be disappointed—after all, study after study has 
demonstrated that online discourse is factually unreliable, 
consists of opinion rather than objective information, creates 
“echo chambers” in which people only talk to or hear from those 
who already agree with them, and therefore reinforce 
polarization in politics24—social networks have successfully 
enabled low-threshold civic engagement by citizens and public 
officials. As of 2010, a study showed that nearly one-third (31 
 
21. Annise Parker, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/MayorAnniseParker (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). 
22. Connect with the City of Chicago via Social Media, CITY OF CHICAGO, 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/narr/misc/social_media.html (Last visited 
Oct. 14, 2010). City officials such as Aldermen have Facebook accounts as 
well. See, e.g., Joe Moore, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/joemoore49 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2010); Danny Alderman, FACEBOOK, http://pt-
pt.facebook.com/pages/Alderman-Danny-Solis/112876165410079 (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2010). 
23. MYSOCIETY.ORG, http://www.mysociety.org (Last visited Oct. 14, 
2010). 
24. See generally Sunstein, supra note 11; see also William H. Dutton & 
Malcolm Peltu, Reconfiguring Government-Public Engagements: Enhancing 
the Communicative Power of Citizens, OXFORD INTERNET INST., 2007, at 12, 
available at http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/publications/FD9.pdf (noting 
that “[u]nregulated forums tend to become boxing rings for the extremes of an 
argument”). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/3
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percent) of online adults use online platforms such as blogs, 
social networking sites, email, online video, or text messaging 
to get government information, and 13 percent of Internet 
users read a government agency or official‟s blog.25 Taken 
together, nearly a quarter of Internet users have posted 
comments or interacted with others online around government 
policies or public issues.26 Civic social networks, like them or 
not, are the new public square. 
 
II. Ejecting Public Officials from the New Public Square 
 
The rapid adoption of social networking tools by public 
officials has left some local governments somewhat shell-
shocked. For those tasked with enforcing open meeting, 
freedom of information, ethics, and campaign finance laws, 
social networks are not so much a great new venue for 
deliberative democracy, but more like new tools with which 
public officials can misbehave. In many cases, local 
governments have proposed restrictions that, for all intents 
and purposes, ban public officials from using social networks in 
their official capacity.27 
 
A. What is Government’s Role in Regulating Public Officials’ 
Presence in the New Public Square? 
 
Policymakers have approached questions about public 
officials‟ use of social networks in a manner consistent with 
their institutional role. The question, for them, is whether the 
activity occurring on social networks may violate existing law, 
and if so, how best to stop and/or punish it.28 Because social 
 
25. Government Online, supra note 12 at 26, 31. 
26. Id. at 31. 
27. See, e.g., Timothy Burgess, Councilmember, City of Seattle, Speech 
at the Meeting of the Seattle Ethics and Elections Comm. (Dec. 2, 2009), 
available at http://www.seattlechannel.org/videos/video.asp?ID=5590985. 
“The draft rules [on social media use by city elected officials] from our staff 
essentially would prohibit city councilmembers from using social media like 
Facebook, Twitter, etc., and that‟s where I have a real objection.” Id. 
28. As I explain in Part III, infra, this is not the only approach to the 
9
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networks are, for the most part, third-party applications, their 
features, format, and rules are not directly controlled by the 
public officials or government agencies that use them.29 
Consequently, any restrictions on use of social media by public 
officials can only be enforced by monitoring and enforcement, 
under threat of some penalty, rather than through design 
modifications or access limitations. 
It is fair to say that public officials cannot be counted upon 
to govern themselves,30 especially when a significant portion of 
the improper use of social networks may be inadvertent, and 
therefore unlikely to be checked internally. But as with other 
government regulation of the Internet, there is broad 
disagreement about the specific role of government and civic 
social networks.31 
Local lawmakers and agencies with the responsibility to 
enforce applicable laws have just begun to grapple with the 
 
issue, but for policymakers tasked with enforcing existing law, it is to be 
expected. As I argue below, I believe the issue would be better addressed with 
an understanding that social networks are not just a tool public officials may 
use or a venue in which they may act, but rather a set of behaviors that 
constitute an emerging institution. 
29. This stands in contrast to, for example, regulation of the use of a 
government building, vehicle, or government-hosted website, all of which can 
be controlled directly. 
30. Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and 
Rapprochement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 
47 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O‟Connell eds., 2010). “Constant 
emphasis on selfish strategic behavior in politics does pose dangers for the 
public spirit. But designing institutions as if people always attempted to act 
in the public interest is almost certainly a formula for disaster.” Id. 
31. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Building the Bottom Up from the Top 
Down, 5 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 141, 145 (2009) [hereinafter 
Building the Bottom Up]. 
 
[W]hat role is there for government to play in encouraging 
the rise of new groups and new self-governing institutions? 
Does it even make any sense to think of building the bottom 
up from the top town, or is the role of academics and 
especially policy-makers limited to that of participant-
observers and cheerleaders waiting for the public to 
spontaneously organize itself? 
 
Id.; see also A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a 
Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 871 (2003). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/3
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problems they see. The first reactions range from outright 
hostility to any civic social networks to conservative counsel to 
enthusiastic embrace.32 As one open-government advocate put 
it, “[government prohibition on social network use] does exhibit 
a trend we‟re seeing—leaders see social media as opening the 
door for risk. But social media and improving online technology 
is only going to make government more accessible. It is a 
challenge but it is a challenge that‟s necessary for governments 
to meet.”33 
The challenge for local governments is to identify where 
civic social networks extend, rather than subvert, valid public 
goals like transparency and accountability. Thus, although 
social networks “are occurring without government 
intervention . . . there remains scope for government to nurture 
them and especially to facilitate solutions to specific problems 
that participants have not as yet been able to solve 
themselves.”34 And as local governments identify problems and 
facilitate solutions, they must recognize that social networks 
are a form of engagement that citizens take seriously as a part 
of their political expression.35 So far, however, those 
governments have reacted in precisely the opposite way. 
 
B. Ejecting Public Officials from the New Public Square 
 
This is not the first time that a new technology has 
emerged, forcing policymakers to assess its impact or threat. In 
the case of social media, agencies have sounded the alarm, in 
particular, over actual or potential violation of freedom of 
information laws, open meetings laws, government ethics rules, 
and campaign finance regulations. Because few (if any) laws 
deal specifically with social networks, policymakers have had 
 
32. See Brody, supra note 12. 
33. R.L. Nave, When Politicians Tweet: Social Media’s Role in Open 
Government, SEATTLEPI.COM (April 27, 2010, 6:57 PM), 
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/418990_socialpols27.html (quoting Sarah 
Schacht, Executive Director for Knowledge as Power). 
34. Building the Bottom Up, supra note 31, at 157. 
35. Chadwick, supra note 4, at 39. 
11
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to extrapolate from existing law, with mixed results.36 
Policymakers have employed two different approaches. 
Under the first approach, an agency has faced a specific 
allegation that a use of civic social networks violates existing 
law and the agency has then determined whether the existing 
law applies to the use of social networks. Under the second 
approach, a policymaking or enforcing agency has raised a 
general alarm about the potential for mischief, and handed 
down a series of rules intended to prevent violations. The 
results have been varied, as demonstrated by the following 
examples: (1) the City of Redondo Beach was advised to avoid 
all use of social networks for any purposes;37 (2) the City of 
Seattle was advised to adopt regulations that would bar City 
Councilmembers from “friending” each other on social 
networks, for fear of allowing inadvertent online meetings in 
violation of the Open Public Meetings Act, and bar any links 
that would lead to third-party content that is commercial (like 
advertisements) or political (like a comment from a constituent 
in support of a campaign);38 (3) Attorneys for a Florida 
municipal planning board told the board that, as a general 
matter, it should not have a social network profile “under any 
circumstances”;39 (4) Attorneys for a collection of Washington 
 
36. Brody, supra note 12, at 54. 
 
Though the realm of Internet media is evolving at light 
speed, it remains tethered to statutory laws that have been 
around for decades . . . [and] state courts have yet to fully 
engage on subjects specific to local government 
requirements and, therefore, at times there is a need to 
extrapolate as to the application of state law to Internet 
social networking. 
 
Id. 
37. Sascha Bush, City Council Wrap, THE BEACH REP., (Aug. 18, 2010, 
5:36 PM), 
http://www.tbrnews.com/articles/2010/08/19/redondo_beach_news/news11.txt. 
38. Ramsey Ramerman & Walter Neary, Social Media: Stepping Out of 
the Box. Staying in the Lines, ASSOCIATION OF WASHINGTON CITIES ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE 31 (2010), available at 
http://www.awcnet.org/trainmaterials/conference/2010/SocialMediaPresentati
on.pdf [hereinafter Stepping Out]. 
39. Kelly Farrell, Attorneys, Legislators to Pull Plug on Marco 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/3
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cities advised city councilmembers to avoid posting any content 
regarding policy or city-related issues;40 and (5) counsel for the 
City of Fort Lauderdale discouraged any City participation on 
Facebook or “any similar interactive communication 
technology.”41 
Agencies, counsel, and public officials have grappled with 
at least three types of potential statutory violations that they 
believe apply to communications among public officials and 
constituents using social networks. 
 
1. Freedom of Information or Public Records Acts 
 
Skeptics point out that public officials‟ use of social 
network sites can create public records that are inaccessible to 
many members of the public in their original location, and may 
not be retained or cataloged in the same way as email or 
written correspondence. Those concerns are well justified. 
Consider the following scenario: Councilmember Jones posts on 
Twitter that he opposes Mayor Smith‟s plan to combat street 
crime: “I stand against @MayorSmith‟s faulty, punitive 
#brokenwindows plan. Let‟s make our streets 
#safeforeveryone!” The post would be published online42 and 
anyone who had a Twitter account who had signed up to follow 
Councilmember Jones would instantly receive the message (as 
would anyone signed up to follow Mayor Smith and anyone 
searching for the hashtags #brokenwindows or 
#safeforeveryone). In addition, those who do not have Twitter 
accounts may view the post for a certain period of time, but 
would not receive a notification when it was posted. 
This raises two questions: First, is Councilmember Jones‟s 
 
Government’s Use of Social Websites?, NAPLESNEWS.COM (July 7, 2009, 1:42 
PM), http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2009/jul/07/attorneys-legislators-pull-
plug-marco-governments-/?printer=1/. 
40. Stepping Out, supra note 38, at 18-19. 
41. Memorandum No. 09-0524 from Harry A. Stewart, City Attorney, Ft. 
Lauderdale, Fla., to Mayor, Vice Mayor, and Commissioners, Update on the 
Law—Facebook Pages and Websites (May 14, 2009), available at 
http://weblogs.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/broward/blog/facebookmemo.rtf. 
42. Twitter posts are limited to 140 characters; the above post is 109. 
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tweet a public record? And second, if so, how would it be found, 
retained, and produced by the City in response to a public 
records or Freedom of Information Act request? 
All fifty states have public records statutes, many modeled 
after the Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).43 These 
laws were a cornerstone of the “sunshine laws” movement that 
began in the 1950s and flourished in the post-Watergate era, 
opening government records to public access on the theory that 
sunshine is the best disinfectant44—that is, public scrutiny 
exposes, and therefore hampers or remedies, corruption. 
Briefly, these statutes require the government to provide 
public records upon request (with certain enumerated 
exceptions). Public records are generally defined as any writing 
or other record containing information relating to the conduct 
of government prepared, owned, used, or retained by any part 
of the government.45 
The key legal questions are well-settled; a public official‟s 
writings, regardless whether they are on a government website 
or not, are public records, so long as the post is pertinent to city 
business.46 The harder question, then, is not the legal but the 
practical one: how best can the government retain a record of 
officials‟ posts on social media so that they can be produced 
upon request under FOIA? 
Seen as a collection of written exchanges, the retention and 
 
43. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy 
and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002). “Today, all fifty 
states have open records statutes, a majority of which are modeled after the 
[Federal Freedom of Information Act].” Id. 
44. This phrase is attributed to Justice Louis Brandeis. See LOUIS 
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE‟S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914) 
(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”). 
45. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(2) (2007). 
46. The common reasoning is well described by the Florida Attorney 
General‟s Office—when a public official chooses to use a non-government 
means of communication (whether email or social networks), then he or she 
agrees that they have supervision and control over the document, and has a 
duty of preservation and disclosure. Brody, supra note 12, at 55; see also 
Nave, supra note 33. “Most states, including Washington, have determined 
that social media activity by government agencies—despite the fact that it 
takes place on privately owned third-party Web services—does fall under the 
purview of the state‟s Public Records Act.” Nave, supra note 33. 
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production of social network posts is not conceptually 
difficult—they are not distinguishable from email. “An 
ordinary email is nothing more than a piece of written 
correspondence transmitted through an efficient and 
inexpensive means. . . . [T]he public‟s interest in overseeing the 
workings of local government is protected in the same way that 
it is for call other types of written correspondence—the public 
may review such correspondence by making a records request 
under the open records provision of state law.”47 
A trickier problem arises due to the lack of permanency of 
social network posts. Consider this scenario: A port 
commissioner criticizes a city councilmember‟s policy proposal 
in a post on Facebook; the other councilmember responds by 
posting something on the port commissioner‟s Facebook page. 
For some reason (perhaps the commissioner regrets his tone, or 
decides that this disagreement need not be public, or realizes 
he was wrong), he removes the original Facebook post, and 
deletes the response posted by the city councilmember.48 
Now, it may be good for the tone of public discourse, and 
maybe even for policy, for these officials to be able to turn back 
the clock to the moment before they hit the “post” or “share” 
button. But the law is clear that both the original post and the 
response are public records, and it is certainly in the public 
interest for voters to have access to the writings of their elected 
officials on policy matters. 
Difficult as these questions are, they are essentially 
technical problems. The right retention tools can ensure that 
all of these writings, wise and unwise, are available for 
production in response to FOIA requests. Inexpensive solutions 
exist that would allow a public official (or her staff) save a 
weekly log of Facebook, Twitter, and blog posts.49 
 
47. John F. O‟Connor & Michael J. Baratz, Some Assembly Required: 
The Application of State Open Meeting Laws to Email Correspondence, 12 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 719, 722 (2004). 
48. This example is not hypothetical. See, e.g., Erica C. Barnett, The 
Disappearing O’Brien-Creighton Facebook Flap, PUBLICOLA (July 30, 2010), 
http://www.publicola.net/2010/07/30/the-disappearing-obrien-creighton-
facebook-flap/. 
49. See, e.g., PAGE FREEZER, http://pagefreezer.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 
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2. Open public meetings 
 
A knottier problem arises under open meeting statutes. 
Because public officials can read each others‟ tweets, blog 
posts, and Facebook updates in real time and respond to them 
instantaneously, they may engage in communication that is 
more similar to a meeting than it is to ordinary 
correspondence. Consider a slight twist on the hypothetical 
Twitter post above: City Councilmember Jones posts his 
opposition to the mayor‟s public safety policy on Facebook. 
Among two dozen reader comments are the following: 
Councilmember Nguyen clicks the “like” button on the post—
signaling to all readers that he agrees with Councilmember 
Jones; Councilmember Diaz comments on the post that she 
thinks the mayor‟s policy does not go far enough; 
Councilmember Rogers writes that he disagrees with 
Councilmember Jones but is open to persuasion; and 
Councilmember O‟Connor links to Councilmember Jones‟s post 
on her own Facebook page and comments that the entire 
question is moot because the public safety budget is strapped.50 
Did a city council meeting just take place on Facebook? 
Open meeting statutes have existed in every state and the 
District of Columbia for over thirty years.51 These laws require 
that most meetings of city or county councils, as well as 
government-authorized boards and commissions, be held with 
notice to and access for the public. The laws can have quite 
powerful enforcement mechanisms; commonly, the remedies for 
violation include individual penalties for the officials, 
municipal liability for any costs and fees, and reversal of the 
government action that was the subject of the meeting.52 
 
2010); BACKUPIFY, http://www.backupify.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
50. I use Facebook purely as an example; a nearly identical exchange 
could take place on Twitter or in the comments section of a blog post. 
51. See, e.g., Susan T. Stephenson, Note, Government in the Sunshine 
Act: Opening Federal Agency Meetings, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 154, 154 n.3 (1976); 
Teresa D. Pupillo, Note, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the 
Sunshine in the 1990s—An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1165, 1167 (1993). 
52. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.060 & .120 (2006). 
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Open meeting statutes are universally interpreted to cover 
not only in-person, face-to-face meetings but also so-called 
“serial” meetings and meetings at which communication is 
done in writing or by telephone.53 More recently, comparable 
communication by email—when it is interactive, deliberative, 
or decisionary in nature, occurs close in time and involves a 
quorum of the relevant government body—has been held to 
violate open meeting laws.54 
While few, if any, court decisions apply open meeting laws 
to social networking, local governments see social networks as 
a particular risk because their structure is designed to 
facilitate casual interaction. For example, posts from “friends” 
or contacts automatically appear on an official‟s profile and it 
takes only a single click to interact with the author. Thus, if 
open meeting laws were applied to civic social networks, a 
“meeting” could occur without any single official intending it. 
After all, these sites were developed, in part, to create virtual 
space in which users could “meet” with a minimum of effort.55 
The first state supreme court to address the applicability of 
open meeting laws to email focused its analysis on whether the 
email exchange had “indicia of simultaneity” that indicate 
government deliberation occurring in real time, but virtual 
space.56 Some other courts do not appear to find significant the 
 
53. See Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. Members of The Redevelopment 
Agency, 214 Cal. Rptr. 561, 562, 564 (1985) (holding that series of telephone 
calls between individual members and attorneys constitute a “meeting” so as 
to violate the California public meeting law). 
54. See Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 27 P.3d 1208 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2001); but see Beck v. Shelton, 593 S.E.2d 195, 201 (Va. 2004) (holding that 
the e-mail communications in this case “did not constitute a meeting”). 
55. Arguably, the hosting sites are fully open to the public for most 
online posts, insofar as the interested citizen can access the post without 
registration, such as for Twitter or a blog, of if registration is free and simple 
(the case with Facebook). But the user agreements for Facebook are not 
simple; one gives up a certain amount of valuable information to Facebook, 
and agrees to terms of use that some find objectionable. Furthermore, in 
order to obtain the desired level of access, one may have become a “follower” 
(on Twitter) or a “friend” or “fan” (on Facebook) of a public official, essentially 
declaring support before even seeing what they have to say. 
56. O‟Connor, supra note 47, at 721; see also Beck, 593 S.E.2d at 198 
(stating that the “e-mail communications did not involve virtually 
simultaneous interaction”). 
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differences between written communication and in-person 
deliberations.57 Generally, however, state courts agree that 
electronic communications like conference calls and email 
exchanges can constitute a meeting under certain 
circumstances.58 
In some significant ways, an exchange between officials on 
a civic social network such as Facebook or Twitter is different 
from an email exchange. For example, an exchange in the 
comments to a blog post on Facebook or Twitter is available for 
anyone to see or join at any time, although there may not be a 
“feasible way for any and all interested members of the public 
to „attend‟ an email communication.”59 In fact, the transparency 
of the exchange and its openness to public participation is 
arguably as great or greater than most traditional public 
meetings. And, as a general matter, the overlapping purposes 
of FOIA laws (ensuring that government records, including 
correspondence, is available to the public) and open meetings 
laws (ensuring that deliberation is public and that constituents 
can engage in the deliberation) are fully accomplished in the 
social networking context in a way that they are not in an 
email exchange, which must be requested formally to be 
 
57. See Wood, 27 P.3d at 1216 (in which the court did not place great 
significance in the immediacy of the exchange); see also O‟Connor, supra note 
47, at 745-46 (“The Wood court gave no apparent consideration to the fact 
that email communications differ from orthodox meetings in that the 
participants are not deliberating at the same time or in the same place. 
Rather, the result depended entirely on the substance of the communications 
and whether the communications involved „the active exchange of 
information and opinions‟ on a matter of public business—which would be 
illegal—or „the mere passive receipt of information‟—which would not be 
illegal.”). 
58. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1-20 (West 2010) (Illinois includes 
any event with “contemporaneous interactive communication” as a meeting 
under the Open Meetings Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-200(2) (West 2010) 
(Connecticut defines “meeting” as “any hearing or other proceeding of a 
public agency, any convening or assembly of a quorum of a multimember 
public agency, and any communication by or to a quorum of a multimember 
public agency, whether in person or by means of electronic equipment, to 
discuss or act upon a matter over which the public agency has supervision, 
control, jurisdiction or advisory power.”). 
59. O‟Connor, supra note 47, at 753. 
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received.60 
Under the current interpretations of open public meeting 
statutes, exchanges like the hypothetical above would almost 
certainly be prohibited. But rather than seek an alternative 
interpretation of the law, or even merely train members to 
avoid a violation, social media skeptics are throwing the baby 
out with the bathwater. The City of Seattle, for example, is 
considering a policy that would “strongly discourage[]” city 
Councilmembers from “friending” each other at all—a solution 
akin to preventing email exchanges or telephone calls between 
members.61 Other governments are advising officials to stay off 
social networks altogether.62 
 
 3. Misuse of Public Resources and Political Content 
 
Policymakers are particularly concerned about the 
potential for government links to social network sites that 
contain political, non-government, or advertising content. 
Although social network sites are not owned by the 
government, if the government‟s website has a direct link to 
the social network, then government resources can be 
interpreted as supporting the content of the social network site. 
This creates a risk of the illegal use of government resources.63 
 
60. See, e.g., Stephen Schaeffer, Comment, Sunshine in Cyberspace? 
Electronic Deliberation and the Reach of Open Meeting Laws, 48 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 755, 778 (2004) (discussing 00-906 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 1 (2001) and 2001-
66 Fla. Op. Att‟y Gen. 1 (2001)). 
61. “Communication between Councilmembers via social media, as with 
telephone and email, may constitute a „meeting‟ under the Open Public 
Meetings Act. For this reason, Councilmembers are strongly discouraged 
from „friending‟ other Councilmembers.” Sample Policy: Use of Social Media 
by City Council Members, SEATTLE LEGISLATIVE DEP‟T, 
http://www.mrsc.org/policyprocedures/s42ccsocialmedia.pdf [hereinafter 
Sample Policy] (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
62. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 37; Farrell, supra note 39; Memorandum 
No. 09-0524, supra note 41; Stepping Out, supra note 38. 
63. Memorandum from Wayne Barnett, Executive Director, Seattle 
Ethics and Elections Commission on Social Media and the Ethics and 
Elections Codes 2 (Nov. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.seattle.gov/ethics/meetings/2009-12-02/item7.pdf (noting that 
government websites are public facilities, and that “using state facilities to 
provide a direct electronic link to a private web page which contains 
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Consider this scenario: Mayor Smith has an official web 
page at his city‟s main website. On that page, there is a sidebar 
encouraging readers to follow the mayor on his blog, Twitter, 
Facebook, and Flickr, with links to those sites.64 
For the purpose of our analysis, assume that the mayor‟s 
blog, Twitter feed, Facebook page, and Flickr account are not 
managed using government funds but by the mayor himself or 
a volunteer. Further, assume that the blog is on Blogger or a 
similar third-party site. May the mayor endorse a candidate for 
office on his Twitter feed? May he post a photo of himself at a 
political rally on Flickr? These examples seem pretty 
straightforward; he may not, because doing so would result in 
city resources directly linking to campaign content posted by a 
city official.65 
But civic social networks, by design, invite participation 
from the public, not just dispatches from officials, and are 
supported by advertising revenues. If the main city website 
includes direct links to the mayor‟s Facebook page, is it 
permissible for the Facebook page to feature commercial 
advertisements? What if a constituent posted a campaign-
related message on the mayor‟s Facebook page, or tagged the 
mayor in a campaign-related Twitter post or photo on Flickr? 
State laws universally bar the use of government resources 
to support a private individual or enterprise, or a political 
campaign.66 Because government websites are maintained with 
public funds, a link from a government website to a social 
network site can run afoul of this prohibition—depending on 
the content of the social network site.67 
 
materials and advertisements that support, or oppose, passage of a ballot 
initiative would also violate” state law). 
64. Seattle Mayor Michael McGinn, SEATTLE.GOV, 
http://seattle.gov/mayor/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
65. Barnett, supra note 63, at 2. 
66. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (barring the government from 
using, giving, or lending its taxing power or credit to aid any private interest 
or individual). 
67. Brody, supra note 12, at 57. “Most Internet networking created by 
elected officials is in some way intended to advance the private interests of 
the official in retaining his or her current position or for obtaining greater 
support at the polls.” Id. “Local government Web sites require public funds to 
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Local governments raise a number of serious concerns. 
Consider the following scenarios: (A) A city‟s official web page 
includes links to Facebook pages maintained by public officials 
or city agencies. Facebook, as a private company, is enjoying 
the benefit of any user traffic driven to its site; (B) a city‟s 
official web page includes links to a blog or Facebook page 
maintained by a public official or city agency. The blog or 
Facebook page includes commercial advertising, and therefore 
is promoting certain businesses; and (C) A city 
councilmember‟s official web page includes a link to his or her 
Facebook page. The councilmember is fastidious about avoiding 
posting any campaign-related content on that site. But, without 
the consent of the councilmember, Facebook displays political 
ads for various candidates along the right margin of the page, 
and constituents of the councilmember post material on the 
page promoting certain candidates.68 For each of these 
scenarios, does the city‟s link constitute an improper use of 
government resources? 
Policymakers and enforcers tend to view scenarios A and B 
as allowable for any or all of three reasons: (1) any support of 
the social network site or advertiser is de minimis; (2) any 
support is unintentional; and (3) any support is a byproduct of 
an allowable government activity or a government purpose (in 
this case, the purpose would be public outreach and 
communication). From a practical standpoint, this makes good 
sense—after all, if a government link to a corporate website or 
a website containing advertising was prohibited, then a county 
could never link to an online newspaper article. 
Scenario C, however, is problematic because support of a 
political campaign can never be a permissible government 
 
be maintained. Therefore, any elected official desiring to link his or her Web 
site to the site of any public entity could potentially be in violation of Fla. 
Const. Art VII, § 10 . . . as arguably the elected official would be exploiting 
public funds for his or her own private benefit. Particularly in an election 
year where campaign material and messages will undoubtedly be promoted 
partially through networking sites, the risk for inadvertently violating these 
provisions is high.” Id. 
68. Facebook‟s placement of ads is more likely to be tied to the profile of 
the viewer, not the Councilmember. 
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purpose.69 The difficulty of this scenario lies in the notion that 
the political content can appear on the public official‟s social 
network site without being posted or approved by the public 
official. Moreover, depending on the social network‟s specific 
features, the public official may not even be able to remove the 
material from the social network. 
Regulators indicate that their preferred solution would 
require public officials to moderate the content on their social 
network pages to prevent political content from appearing. This 
assumes, first, that the public official has some control over the 
content—which he may not—and second, imposes on the public 
official the need to police the social network site for 
inappropriate material. The analogy used by some regulators 
was summarized by the executive director of the Seattle Ethics 
and Elections Commission: 
 
Just as it would violate the Elections Code for a 
City officer or employee to authorize a campaign 
rally in a City conference room, so too would it 
violate the elections Code if a City officer or 
employee permitted the public to hold a virtual 
campaign rally in the comments thread on a blog 
accessible from a City site. In both cases, City 
resources are being used for unlawful purposes, 
which the City official has authorized.70 
 
Thus, a public official would be prohibited from using any 
civic social network that could allow other users to post 
political material. 
 
 
 
 
69. The scenario described is not unique to Facebook. A constituent (or 
anyone) could post campaign-related material on Twitter and, by tagging the 
public official, it would show up in the official‟s Twitter feed; similarly, a 
constituent could post campaign-related material in the comments thread of 
a blog post. 
70. Barnett, supra note 63, at 5. 
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C. Why the Solutions Offered by Local Governments Do not 
Work 
 
Ill-crafted approaches offered by policymakers and 
enforcers, such as barring social network use at all, prohibiting 
councilmembers from “friending” each other, or holding public 
officials responsible for third-party content, result in 
impractical solutions. Regulators have addressed social 
networks by applying existing law to a possible problem, and 
attempting to extrapolate a solution based on previous 
applications of the law to email, conference calls, and 
conference rooms in government buildings. 
The result of such extrapolations has been a contradictory 
collection of rules attempting to patch specific problems. For 
example, the U.S. Senate Internet Services Usage Rules and 
Policies permit Senators to maintain a third-party website—
such as a blog or Facebook page—but only one that does not 
permit “personal, promotional, commercial or partisan 
political/campaign-related content or links to an Office-
maintained website or channel.”71 Thus, a senator cannot 
maintain a social network site with personal information and it 
cannot link back to his or her official Senate website. Such a 
policy, in an attempt to avoid possible conflicts with existing 
rules, establishes new rules that are certain to be ignored; it 
takes seconds to find a senator‟s Facebook page featuring 
promotional, commercial, and personal content or with links to 
an office-maintained website.72 
Local governments‟ solutions are also often internally 
inconsistent. For example, Seattle‟s draft policy encourages city 
councilmembers to use social media that can record the 
identity of a commenter and restrict users‟ ability to comment, 
most often done by requiring registration (i.e., Blogger/Google‟s 
 
71. U.S. Senate Internet Services Usage Rules and Policies, SENATE.GOV, 
http://www.senate.gov/usage/internetpolicy.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). 
72. See, e.g., Senator Mitch McConnell, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/#!/pages/Senator-Mitch-
McConnell/20163125303?ref=ts (last visited Nov. 15. 2010); Mitch McConnell, 
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/mitchmcconnell (last visited Nov. 15, 
2010). 
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registration requirement). Yet the policy, mere lines later, 
states that, “[s]ites requiring membership or subscription 
should be avoided.”73 This not only contradicts the desire for 
control that can only come with registration, but also rules out 
the majority of popular social networking sites, such as 
Facebook, MySpace, or Twitter. 
Fundamentally, the failure of open meeting and campaign 
laws to address social networks stems from these local laws‟ 
approach: they deal with social networks as if they are only a 
tool with which officials act in ways similar to the tools 
available in 1976. Consequently, it is a mistake to assume that 
our existing rules will apply to social networks with a couple of 
tweaks. Scenario C described above (dealing with the 
regulation of third-party content) demonstrates that the 
existing rules fail to address much of the most problematic, and 
hardest to police, behavior. I suggest that the challenge is not 
to develop micro-rules that would prevent this behavior, but 
instead to step back and take a close look at the behavioral 
norms and pressures that are developing around this 
institution, and see what it is we are dealing with. 
The failure of policymakers to develop guidelines that 
make sense for civic social networks is not surprising since it is 
impossible to predict the specific shape of social networks or 
how they will interact with public officials in the future. As 
Jerry Mashaw put it, “we do not really have much information 
about how to design institutions that take the taste-shaping 
aspects of public action seriously. We know very little about 
how institutional taste shaping works.”74 Nevertheless, if we 
are to understand the opportunities and risks that social 
networks offer public officials and their constituents, we have 
to understand the environment that has led to their extremely 
rapid adoption and the patterns of behavior that have 
developed around their use. As I argue in Part III, these 
behaviors have become so pronounced that they have begun to 
take the shape of a new unstructured institution—not an 
 
73. Sample Policy, supra note 61. 
74. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC 
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 28 (1997). 
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organization, but rather a set of interrelated strategic 
behaviors that, in turn, affects the behavior around it. 
 
III.  Social Networks Are a New Institutional Environment 
 
Social networking by public officials and their constituents 
has exploded in the last four years,75 but the most astonishing 
aspect of civic social network is not their rapid adoption, 
usefulness, or ability to facilitate different kinds of 
communication. The most striking aspect of this phenomenon 
is that the behaviors on all sides of the communication 
matrix—that is, among both officials and constituents—already 
have recognizable patterns and norms of such consistency that 
they constitute an emerging unstructured institution. This 
Part argues that policymakers must understand the 
characteristics of this institution if they are to regulate public 
officials‟ use of social networks. 
 
A. Social Networking as a Public Choice and Rational Choice 
Institutionalism Topic 
 
An analysis of the pressures on and behavior of public 
officials and their constituents demonstrates that social 
networks are more than simply new venues in which public 
officials and their constituents act. Rather, social networks 
have a distinct social logic driven by the self-interested 
behavior of users.76 
Although there are many ways to examine political 
behavior, social networking is especially appropriate for the 
use of public choice theory and rational choice institutionalism; 
the environment involves a very large number of low-threshold 
but distinct decisions, and each of these decisions indicates an 
 
75. See generally Smith, supra note 12. The timing has many sources, 
but the single largest contributor is apparently the expansion of Facebook in 
2006 from college students (or anyone with a .edu email address) to the 
public at large. 
76. See generally CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF 
ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS (2008). Shirky‟s book describes in great 
and entertaining detail the underlying logic of social networks. 
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expression of specific desires on behalf of the user. When a 
public official or a constituent decides to begin, continue, or 
expand the use of online social networking—whether to sign in, 
to send a message, to post information, or to organize a group—
the decisions involve individual calculations about the use of 
time, attention, and communication. And because the specific 
sites and tools employed today are certain to change quickly 
and dramatically, it is important to apply tools of analysis that 
do not take as a constant any feature of this environment other 
than the aggregated preferences and decisions of the users. 
Consequently, this Part applies tools from public choice 
theory and rational choice institutionalism77 to assess the 
incentives, costs, and emerging institutional characteristics 
driving the behavior of public officials and their constituents 
when using social networks. Public choice theory takes some 
well-deserved criticism for its assumption of purely rational 
and selfish behavior; Professor Mashaw demonstrates (with 
devastating effectiveness) the frequent inability of public choice 
to explain even common political behavior.78 By applying these 
 
77. I do not mean to suggest that public choice or rational choice is the 
only way to understand public officials and social networks. “Public choice is 
not the sole method of analysis of a given legal problem. However, it can 
serve to enrich the analytical framework of law and legal institutions. Some 
features of law that seem puzzling to traditional analytical approaches can be 
explained by public choice analysis.” D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the 
Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) 
(reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS 
AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009)). 
78. Mashaw, supra note 30. Mashaw demonstrates that public choice 
theory does not appear to describe how law actually gets made at all, and 
fails to agree on enough of the key questions to not be of much use. But I 
think that Mashaw takes public choice theory perhaps too seriously, in a way 
(or maybe it is the theorists who take their own work too seriously, and 
Mashaw does them the honor of responding in kind). I view public choice as a 
series of theories that seek to describe forces at work in law and democracy, 
but do not claim to be the only forces or the only applicable theories. By 
analogy, Newton‟s Law of Gravity is no less true for the fact that mountains 
rise and clouds stay aloft, unexplained by gravity; it is just that those 
phenomena require more than one theory to explain their existence and 
behavior. In the same way, public choice theory can help explain why social 
networks, as applied to public officials, has developed as an unstructured 
institution. It can help explain the ways that institution may change in the 
future, and the ways that government may police the ways that it is used by 
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tools, I do not suggest that they are the only way to look at this 
problem, or that they explain everything. But public choice 
does identify and explain a number of the more interesting 
features of the use of social networks by public officials, and 
the deficiencies and potential of policymakers‟ efforts to 
regulate it. 79 
The most basic assumptions of public choice theory are 
that the relevant actors have an identifiable set of preferences 
or tastes, that they behave so as to maximize the attainment of 
those preferences, and that they do so strategically.80 In this 
case, the key actors are public officials and their constituents, 
both of whom use (or are interested in using) social networks. 
The actors share some of the same incentives in their behavior, 
and are divergent in others. But primary among those shared 
are what Professor Grimmelmann refers to as the “social 
imperatives” of “identity, relationships, and community.”81 It is 
those “imperatives” and the underlying logic of social networks 
that makes them important to understand for policymakers 
seeking to regulate public officials‟ conduct. As Grimmelmann 
notes, “[w]e cannot and should not beat these social urges out 
of people; we cannot and should not stop people from acting on 
them. . . . New technologies matter when they change the 
dynamics of how people do things together; the challenge for 
technology law is always to adapt itself to these changing 
dynamics.”82 
Even with those “social imperatives,” any individual‟s 
decision to use social networking faces questions familiar to 
 
public officials. 
79. As Sokol explains, “[u]nderstanding public choice allows actors in the 
legal and political systems to better understand policy trade-offs and 
implications. With this knowledge, such actors can make decisions more 
likely to maximize social welfare.” Sokol, supra note 77 (citing Mashaw, 
supra note 74, at 31). 
80. Mashaw, supra note 30 (“As has been noted, the crucial unifying 
thread in public choice theory is the assumption that all actors in political 
life—voters, interest groups, representatives, legislative committees, 
bureaucrats or courts—behave rationally to maximize or optimize some 
objective function (wealth, status, power).”). 
81. Grimmelman, supra note 1, at 1206. 
82. Id. 
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public choice. Rational choice institutionalists see politics as a 
set of collective action dilemmas, or situations in which a group 
of individuals trying to maximize their own desired outcome 
are likely, through their aggregated individual action, to 
produce an outcome that is collectively less than optimal. The 
question then is framed as how institutions are created or 
governed that affect the collective action problem (whether by 
overcoming it, changing the type of problem, or exacerbating 
it). In our example—online social networking—the questions 
are: how and why did online social networks arise in the 
political context? Why do people find them useful? And what 
does their growth say about the wisdom of restrictions on their 
use by public officials? 
The best way to understand how social networks function 
in conjunction with public officials is to understand the 
behavior of the two types of actors in the relationship: public 
officials and their constituents. 
 
B. Why Do Public Officials Want to Use Social Networks? 
 
Social scientists who examine social networking by public 
officials sometimes view the dynamic between the government 
and the public as a relationship between supply of information 
(by public officials) and demand (by constituents).83 Although 
that framework may help describe certain ways that the 
government and public interact on the Internet, it bears little 
resemblance to the social networking environment, which 
features much more give-and-take on both sides. In fact, an 
analysis of social network sites that fails to recognize the 
demand by officials of others in the network will miss the ways 
that officials‟ behavior helps solve many of the collective action 
problems that may otherwise stymie widespread use by the 
public. Consequently, this subsection assesses values and 
tastes that prompt public officials to use social networks; the 
specific behavior in which those values and tastes are 
 
83. See Chadwick, supra note 4, at 26. Chadwick refers to the “demand 
side—the perspective of citizens” and the “supply side—the perspective of 
government organizations.” Id. 
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manifested; the forces that their behavior brings to bear on 
other users of social networks; and the ways that behavior of 
public officials is restrained (by themselves or other factors). 
 
1. Why Do Public Officials Use Social Networks? 
 
Public choice theory traditionally takes a very dim view of 
the motivations of public officials. Generally, elected officials 
are portrayed as valuing re-election above all else; for 
appointed officials, the expansion of budget and power is 
paramount.84 
Debunking, explaining, and expanding this view of the 
motivations of public officials has been a minor industry for 
decades. The upshot of this research, both theoretical and 
empirical, has been that re-election, budget, and power are all 
important goals of public officials, but that such a view 
oversimplifies a very complex and layered collection of values. 
For example, in his books Congressmen in Committees and 
Home Style, Richard Fenno, Jr. highlighted as additional goals 
the desire for reputation among other elected officials, the hope 
of election to higher office, and the accomplishment of stated 
legislative goals (in the abstract), and the notion of a legacy.85 
Surely it is not difficult to identify behavior of public 
officials that appears to satisfy these goals, whether cynical or 
laudably civic in nature. But what specifically does a public 
official value that might prompt him or her to use social 
networks and affect how he or she might use them? 
Most obviously, officials value the ability to distribute 
information to a large number of people. There are specific 
qualities or types of mass communication that carry greater 
value; for example, public officials value in particular the 
ability to send a desired message; the ability to send it to a 
 
84. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT (1971). 
85. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973); 
RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 
(1978); see also Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the 
Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw out that Baby, 
87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 322 (2002). 
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specific group of people (supporters, persuadable voters, people 
in a particular geographic area); and the ability to get the 
recipients to actually read/view/hear the message. Closely 
related is the effectiveness of the message—in other words, the 
ability to get the recipient to act in the manner intended. 
All of the above examples, however, deal only with 
outbound connections, or the broadcast from the public official 
to constituents. But public officials value more than merely 
outbound messages, no matter how targeted and effective; they 
also value inbound connections. An inbound connection or 
communication is valued at several levels. First, it has value 
for the information that the content conveys—for example 
support or opposition on a particular issue, or substantive 
information about a matter that may come before the official 
for a decision. Second, it has value for the information conveyed 
by the sender‟s identity; public officials want to know who, 
specifically, is in contact with their office and why. Third, the 
inbound connection may have secondary power that the receipt 
of such messages gives the public official (that is, a public 
official may value the ability to claim he has received a number 
of inquiries or communications on a subject). Fourth, the 
connection may be valuable because of the opinion or 
information it delivers. And fifth, the inbound connection 
carries significance as an indicator of a much stronger 
relationship between the constituent and the public official. 
In addition, public officials value highly their reputation or 
public image and the ability to control that public image. 
Among the aspects of image that a public official may value are 
the appearances of sincerity, deliberation, principle, and 
interest or concern in any individual problem or issue. To the 
extent that a public official can fine-tune his or her reputation 
or public image, he or she will value the tools that allow it. 
From a public choice perspective, a public official‟s 
behavior should demonstrate that he or she also wants to fulfill 
all of these goals, values, and desires, to the extent possible, 
without a minimum of effort or expense—and, if at all possible, 
shifting any effort or expense onto someone else.86 In other 
 
86. In the parlance of public choice theory, public officials (and everyone 
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words, to the extent that the public official can obtain her goals 
without having to give up anything, all the better. Thus, we 
should expect to see public officials use social networks only to 
the extent that: (a) they can free ride on others‟ efforts, thus 
avoiding a collective action problem; (b) they can capture the 
fruits of others‟ labor, therefore making any remaining effort or 
expenditure lesser than the projected benefit; or (c) the 
remaining potential benefits still outweigh the costs of full 
individual efforts. 
 
2. How Do Public Officials Use Social Networks? 
 
To a significant degree, the private sector has invested in 
the software infrastructure that greatly lowers the threshold 
for public officials (or anyone) to use social networking. 
Companies like Facebook, Twitter, News Corp. (owner of 
MySpace), and Google (owner of Blogger) have made available 
social networking software at no or very low cost and 
established business models that benefit primarily from large 
numbers of users (generally, advertising). These two factors—
the establishment multiple social networking platforms and 
the existence of a large number of people to connect to on those 
platforms—remove two of the most obvious investment 
problems for public officials (who could not individually create 
the software and would have no use for social networks if they 
were not already populated). 
The wide spectrum of possible social networking activity 
for public officials shows the various ways that officials have 
confronted the remaining collective action problems. This 
section aims to describe specifically how public officials are 
using social networks in relation to their desires and values, 
described above. 
 
else in the political landscape) try to “free ride” by enjoying public goods 
produced by others, and seek “rents,” or the ability to capture any excess 
value that is produced by someone else‟s (or the public‟s) investment. The 
theory is often summarized in the public choice context as the notion that 
private, selfish interest, rather than public interest, drives the actions of both 
individuals and groups. See, e.g., George Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
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First, public officials have adopted social networks for 
outbound connections and communications—by which one 
transmits information in a one-way manner to constituents. 
The lowest-threshold options for this type of communication 
are the establishment of a “profile” with information about 
oneself and outward-directed posts viewable by either other 
network members or the public at large. 
More specifically, public officials use the “profile” portion of 
social networking sites to craft a public image more textured 
than possible in most traditional media. The mere act of 
establishing a Facebook page, a blog, or a Twitter account 
sends a message suggesting modernity, openness, and a 
willingness to surrender some amount of privacy to viewers. 
Identity is also conveyed by frequency and content of posts; a 
public official can convey a hardworking image of a ubiquitous 
or omnipresent public servant, for example, by posting about 
her geographic location. 
Outbound connections featuring only material that could 
be found elsewhere are the lowest-threshold social network 
communications and have many similarities to bulk emails or 
mass mailings. Correspondingly, they are not valued highly by 
other users. More complex are the combinations of outbound 
and inbound connections that really distinguish social media 
from traditional junk mail. As described above, public officials 
attach significant value to inbound connections. The reason is 
easy to identify—it is that an outbound connection includes 
information about identity, but an inbound connection suggests 
the existence of a relationship. Most commonly, public officials 
use inbound connections to establish relationships with 
constituents, and carry on those relationships in an exchange 
of comments and posts on the public official‟s profile (whether 
on Facebook, Twitter, or a blog). Although it is clear that the 
dialogue between public officials and constituents establishes 
and strengthens relationships, public officials have been 
reluctant to incorporate online discourse into their formal 
decision-making process.87 
 
87. Chadwick states that “there is a marked reluctance on the part of 
elected officials and public sector bureaucrats to enshrine deliberative online 
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In addition, public officials appear interested in using 
social networks to inform and motivate constituents around 
specific issues—in other words, to generate the sense of 
community that draws value from the cross-constituent 
relationships. 
As a general matter, public officials benefit from the 
concentration (or concentrated availability) of information 
about and generated by constituents that appears in social 
networks.88 In this way, public officials capture rents from the 
concentration of individuals volunteering information about 
themselves. But the capture is non-exclusive; public officials 
merely enjoy to an unusual degree this information as a public 
good. And once the structure has been established, individual 
users sign up without incremental cost, and each additional 
user adds value to the network at large (value accruing to both 
the elected official and the other users—the elected official gets 
information from more sources and distributes more 
information to more sources, while the individual user enjoys a 
larger community of like-minded individuals).89 
 
3. Dynamics Driven by Public Officials Using Social 
Networks 
 
The interests and activities of public officials on social 
networks creates certain dynamics that affect other users 
within the system. For example, public officials are bound to 
have more inbound than outbound connections, placing a strain 
on the officials‟ attention and driving her to use higher-
efficiency tools to maintain an online presence. In addition, 
many of the benefits of social networks (such as access to 
 
consultation into their routine modes of operation.” Chadwick, supra note 4, 
at 16. 
88. Id. (“[I]nformational value emerges from the confluence of 
distributed user generated content and its centralized exploitation . . . In the 
realm of political campaigns, e-government, and e-democracy, social 
networking sites thus offer political actors many advantages over the open 
web.”). 
89. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Rational Choice Institutionalism, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 23-38 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. 
eds., 2006). 
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others‟ personal information or access to their attention) are 
concentrated in public officials in much the same way they are 
concentrated in other “nodes.” 
The activity patterns of public officials also create 
incentives for other users. A public official who encourages 
constituents to interact (whether by explicitly asking them to 
or implicitly, by engaging with them when they do) is 
expressing a demand that often provokes its own supply. 
Similarly, a public official who cultivates a large collection of 
constituents online may create a community of easily organized 
users who may overcome other collective action problems. 
In this way, public officials who initiate the use of social 
networks are “political entrepreneurs” or leaders that offer 
their constituencies an opportunity to overcome collective 
action problems by engaging in the civic social network.90 
These dynamics encourage a pattern of behavior in which, in 
Shepsle‟s words, “particular individuals may make unusually 
large contributions of time and energy and financial and 
(especially) logistical resources not (only) because they care 
passionately about the group‟s objective but (also) because they 
see an opportunity to parlay this investment into something 
personally (read: selectively) rewarding.”91 
 
C. Why Do Constituents Interact with Public Officials in Civic 
Social Networks? 
 
Public officials use online social networks simply because 
constituents use them; without the ability to interact with 
voters, the networks are useless. But why do constituents use 
social networks to interact with public officials? The 
motivations of users in general has been studied and described 
at length elsewhere, and surely is the subject of intense, 
around-the-clock advertising research.92 But do people take 
 
90. Id. (citing Robert Wagner, Pressure Groups and Political 
Entrepreneurs, in 1 PAPERS ON NON-MARKET DECISION MAKING 161 (Gordon 
Tolluck ed., 1966) and N. Frohlich et al., POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND 
COLLECTIVE GOODS (1971)). 
91. Id. at 31. 
92. For a detailed analysis of user‟s general motivations in using social 
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time away from playing Farmville, tagging photos, watching 
piano-playing-cat videos, and stalking former significant others 
to read and respond to a tweet from their city councilmember? 
We know that they do93—but why? 
The question is both theoretical and empirical. The 
theoretical question is a familiar collective action problem—the 
story of rational voter apathy, or the notion that low-level 
political participation like voting or emailing an elected official 
is a fundamentally irrational behavior. This story is an old one. 
It goes like this: 
If a citizen took the time to calculate the odds that her vote 
would make the difference in any given election, she would find 
that the possible benefit of having his or her views expressed 
by the victor is far outweighed by the inconvenience of voting. 
And if that citizen then took into account the possibility that 
the elected official would, in fact, express the citizen‟s 
preferences, and that the individual legislator‟s vote on that 
matter would also make the difference in the legislature‟s 
action, then the citizen‟s calculation of possible benefit would 
be further reduced.94 
The same reasoning applies to other low-threshold political 
activities, such as writing a letter to elected officials or 
participating in a rally—or connecting with public officials on 
civic social networks. In nearly all cases, the probability that 
an individual will have influence on actual policy is so small 
that it cannot be justified by the individual effort required to 
participate politically. Further exacerbating the situation is the 
tendency of rational voters to free ride on the efforts of others: 
if two voters want the same policy, each would do best to let the 
other do the work of getting the policy adopted.95 At the same 
 
networks, see Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 1151. 
93. Smith, supra note 12, at 26. 
94. See generally JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS 
OF CONSENT; LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962). 
95. All potential political action is beset by the free rider problem. See, 
e.g., Mashaw, supra note 30, at 22 (“The crucially important question then is, 
„Which groups will form and engage in political action?‟ Or to put it in other 
terms, „How can the free rider problem be solved for groups who would be 
better off if they could all act together to pursue policies that benefit the 
group?‟”). 
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time that public choice theory posits that rational voters will 
refrain from low-threshold, low-reward political activity, it 
predicts that constituents (or groups or corporations) will seek 
to capture benefits created by others, especially where benefits 
can be concentrated and costs distributed. 
The rational choice argument against political 
participation is worth repeating here not because it describes 
what we observe in the real world; rather, it is helpful because 
the differences between the rational model and the real world 
tell us significant things about how the real world works and 
how it can be governed. In the context of social networks, why 
do people participate? 
 
1. What Do Constituents Value When They Engage Public 
Officials on Social Networks? 
 
As with public officials, supra, this section first asks what 
constituents value—essentially, what are they looking for when 
they consider “friending” their mayor?96 The environment a 
constituent encounters when considering the use of civic social 
networks, however, is quite different. Unlike public officials, 
most users of social networks were not prompted to join them 
in order to communicate about politics or policy, and therefore 
their social networking experience includes public officials as a 
part, but not the most important part, of their experience. This 
section, then, focuses only on those aspects of constituents‟ 
social networking that concern interaction between public 
officials and their networks. 
 
a. Identity and Expression 
 
The first step in joining a social network is the creation of 
an online profile, but a constituent‟s identity in the network 
goes beyond basic personal information to include everything 
the user does on the network. Users create and manage their 
online identity as a means of expressing opinions, exercising 
 
96. For a more detailed exploration of the motivations on an individual 
user, see Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 1151. 
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influence, and distributing information. 
The aspect of identity and expression that bears on civic 
social networks is the fundamentally narcissistic behavior of 
constituents—that is, the portion of the user‟s activity that 
appears entirely self-absorbed or self-interested (in a way that 
would make any public choice theorist proud). A self-interested 
user will value anything that allows her to craft her identity 
specifically and increases the power of her individual voice 
relative to others. What makes this interesting from a public 
choice perspective is that this narcissism creates public goods 
because certain self-expressive (or self-indulgent) behaviors 
have an identifiable connection to civic engagement: the 
exercise of speech, self-governance, and associational liberty. 
Papacharissi, drawing upon Inglehart and Welzel, wrote of a 
“civically motivated narcissism,” based on the idea that “self-
expression values are connected to the desire to control one‟s 
environment, a stronger desire for autonomy, and the need to 
question authority” and that “self-expression values are not 
uncivic.”97 Consequently, the exercise of purely self-interested 
or narcissistic behavior can create public goods. 
 
b. Relationships 
 
Second, constituents greatly value the creation of 
relationships, both with public officials and with other users. 
The act of adding someone as a contact (or friend, or followee) 
can have layers of significance: it can mean that the two users 
are actually friends; that they are merely acquaintances; that 
one is a “connector” or hub to many other users; a potential 
business contact; or a fan or supporter. 
Relationships have value, as well, because of their 
reciprocal nature. As Grimmelmann points out, “[p]eople 
reciprocate because it helps them solve collective-action 
problems, because participation in a gift culture demands that 
 
97. Chadwick, supra note 4, at 32 (citing Zizi Papacharissi, The Virtual 
Sphere 2.0: The Internet, the Public Sphere and Beyond, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNET POLITICS 236-39 (Andrew Chadwick & Philip N. Howard, eds., 
2008)). 
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gifts be returned or passed along, because it‟s disrespectful to 
spurn social advances, because there‟s a natural psychological 
instinct to mirror what one‟s conversational partner is doing, 
and because we learn how to conduct ourselves by imitating 
others.”98 
The creation of a relationship with a public official is 
significant in distinct ways. It indicates an increase in 
expressive power or voice, it also feeds the vanity or ego of the 
user. In addition, it increases the perceived status of the 
individual over those who do not share the same relationship. 
In the context of such user-official connections, a user will 
value authenticity, attention, responses, the prestige that 
comes with a personal relationship, and real or perceived 
influence. 
Empirical research indicates that the connections on civic 
social networks are not purely online or “virtual”; rather, they 
tend to continue, further develop, or deepen a relationship from 
offline.99 
 
c. Community 
 
Third, constituents value the community that arises from 
the creation of relationships in civic social networks. For the 
purposes of this analysis, the most salient characteristic of 
community as developed by civic social networks is that they 
reduce the costs of organizing among individuals in the 
network to the vanishing point.100 The opportunity to create 
affinity or advocacy groups with hardly any identifiable costs 
has led to an explosion of lasting and temporary groups. 
Although there is evidence that those participating in political 
activities online are no different than those doing so offline, the 
 
98. Grimmelman, supra note 1, at 1156. 
99. Boyd, supra note 5 (citing Nicole B. Ellison et al., The Benefits of 
Facebook “Friends": Exploring the Relationship Between College Students' use 
of Online Social Networks and Social Capital, J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED 
COMM.(1997), available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue4/ellison.html). 
100. Shirky, supra note 76, at 22 (“[M]ost of the barriers to group action 
have collapsed, and without those barriers, we are free to explore new ways 
of gathering together and getting things done.”). 
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availability of impulsive or casual group formation is quite 
different than what can take place offline.101 
Communities are particularly easy to develop in this 
environment because the indicia of commonality that can 
prompt organization and grouping—politics, government, or 
public affairs—is much stronger in the subgroup of people 
using civic social networks than in the population at large.102 
And the ease of group formation and organization, together 
with the incentives for joining civic social networks, snowball 
the benefits for joining the network for each new user, 
reinforcing the “comedy of the commons”103 scenario. Any given 
individual has incentive to increase his voice, gain attention, 
and strengthen networks and community by creating an online 
community. 
 
d. Information 
 
Constituents also use civic social networks for one purpose 
distinct from voice, relationships, or community, but one that 
feeds into all three: constituents value the availability and 
acquisition of information. Much of this information stems from 
the other aspects of social networking—the awareness of who is 
in Councilmember Jones‟s network, or what issues are 
significant to another constituent. And the somewhat 
voyeuristic aspect of this access to information about civic 
social networks arises from the desire for transparency and 
accountability of public processes. 
A few aspects of this are worth emphasizing: the nature of 
information, when openly accessible, as a public good; the need 
to filter or prioritize content in the event of information 
overload; and the value of information for the twin public goals 
 
101. Cf. Jessica T. Feezell et al., Facebook is . . . Fostering Political 
Investment: A Study of Online Social Networking Groups and Offline 
Participation, APSA TORONTO MEETING PAPER (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1451456. 
102. Shirky, supra note 76, at 199-200. 
103. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 768 (1986) (describing 
social situations in which a “the more the merrier” dynamic prevails). 
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of transparency and accountability. 
Significantly, access to information is not a secretive or 
private benefit in the context of civic social networks; because a 
connection between two users must include a certain level of 
access to information posted by each user, information is 
integrated into every relationship in the network. Users may 
value being the first to discover or post information, but the 
value comes from the distribution of the information, not from 
possessing it to the exclusion of others. In this way, the things 
that public choice theorists might consider costs (becoming 
informed about public issues, organizing groups) are actually 
benefits that citizens enjoy when they act politically, and 
things that public choice theorists might consider valuable only 
if managed as a private good or rent, in fact, gain value when 
treated as a public good.104 
The access to information, however, has a downside in its 
ubiquity; civic social networks simply contain too much 
information for users to process. But the nature of the network 
also creates value because it can prioritize, filter, or 
contextualize the information. In other words, civic social 
networks, by allowing users to see what is popular within their 
network, help users mediate, sort, or personalize what is 
otherwise an information overload.105 
The type of information present on civic social networks 
reveals a second downside, as well. As Feezell et al. noted, 
Facebook encourages political participation but does not appear 
to improve political knowledge: “Our content analysis indicates 
that political Facebook group users often do not share much 
new information and the information they do share tends to be 
somewhat inaccurate, incoherent, or not very well supported 
with evidence. As a forum for people to easily engage and share 
their opinions, online groups are beneficial; however as a forum 
 
104. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
105. This is not seen by all scholars as an unqualified good; as Perez 
notes, such use of network recommendations leads to only reinforcing 
existing beliefs, rather than deliberation or a better-informed citizenry. Oren 
Perez, Complexity, Information Overload and Online Deliberation, 43 I/S: J.L. 
& POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 57 n.39 (2008). 
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to learn new political information online groups are ineffective 
due in part to low quality wall discussion.”106 
Regardless of the attempts to measure accuracy of political 
knowledge, the availability of information on social networks is 
valued highly by constituents for its role in accountability and 
transparency. The information a user gleans from observing a 
public official‟s activity in the civic social network helps the 
constituent understand the official‟s behavior. In turn, the 
information helps the user vote and make other political 
decisions accordingly.107 
The desire for information, and the drive to share it with 
others on one‟s network, is closely related to the other values 
expressed by constituents—identity, relationships, and 
community. But, as discussed in part IV, infra, it has a 
significant independent impact on the shape of the emerging 
institution of civic social networks.108 
 
2. Dynamics Driven by Constituent Behavior in Civic Social 
Networks. 
 
The values and activity patterns of constituents in civic 
social networks create pressures and demands on other actors 
in the networks. For example, the low costs or barriers to group 
formation help overcome standard collective action obstacles to 
cooperation, but also render group formation so easy that the 
resulting organizations often have little impact as aggregators; 
they have much greater impact as distributors. 
Most prominently, the presence of millions of constituents 
 
106. Feezell et al, supra note 101, at 14. 
107. Perez, supra note 105, at 45 (Perez notes that “the increasing 
importance of transparency in the common understanding of legitimate 
governance. The doctrine of transparency has also become one of the more 
influential principles of modern administrative law, greatly increasing the 
amount of information available for democratic reflection.”). 
108. Another part of this phenomenon is both the vagueness and the 
specificity of the targeting of messages in social media. Even messages that 
aren‟t directed at you gain a sort of personal content when they are publicly 
available on social networking sites. For a general discussion of how user-
generated content is meaningful because of targeting, see Shirky, supra note 
76, at 87-88. 
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(and potential voters) on social networks, and the interest or 
willingness of a substantial subset of those constituents to 
engage with public officials online, creates a very strong 
incentive for public officials to join the networks. 
Once the official is in the network, however, the behavior 
of constituents puts severe demands on public officials. The 
ease with which constituents or organizations may access a 
public official‟s attention using a social network leads to a very 
high demand on the public official‟s attention and time; 
consequently, officials themselves will seek to offer authenticity 
and relationship-strengthening interaction only at a level that 
is worth the time and effort. This behavior, in turn, reduces the 
value of the interaction; just as public officials discount the 
value of form emails, constituents discount the value of 
inauthentic or impersonal communications by public 
officials.109 
In addition, the desire of constituents for transparency, 
information, and accountability can put severe demands on 
public officials and agencies that either cannot or would prefer 
not to put all communications and documents online for use by 
the network. Constituents will value highly all disclosure. 
Indeed, they will resist efforts by public officials to shield 
information from public view. 
The use of civic social networks by constituents creates a 
strong temptation for public officials to use the networks for 
campaign activity as well. Constituents may not recognize the 
distinction between official activity and political activity, but, 
as discussed in section III.B.3, supra, the distinction is critical 
for the prevention of corruption. There is no internal check on 
such activity—neither public officials nor constituents will 
punish or disincentivize campaign activity using a social 
network account connected to a government link—and 
therefore such behavior can only be prevented or punished by 
external enforcement. 
 
109. See, e.g., Chadwick, supra note 4, at 28 (“Trust is one of the most 
valuable and one of the most elusive forces in online politics.”); see also Perez, 
supra note 105, at 58 (discussion of discount of email or webform-generated 
comments). 
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D. Social Networks Represent an Emerging Institutional 
Environment 
 
The rapid development of civic social networks belies the 
existence of strong patterns of behavior by both constituents 
and public officials in those networks. Those patterns, in turn, 
demonstrate ways that civil social networks reinforce and 
channel certain behaviors.110 Although the exact features and 
brand names of social networks are bound to change, their 
effect on interactions among constituents and public officials is 
here to stay. The ways that civil social networks and behaviors 
interact indicates that the networks are not just a tool, like 
email or the telephone, but instead resemble an unstructured 
institution like the press or lobbyists.111 
 
1. What is an Unstructured Institution? 
 
Public choice theory has developed at least two major ways 
to think about institutions (often discussed under the subject 
“rational choice institutionalism”). Under the first, institutions 
are the set of rules and regulations constraining individuals‟, 
groups‟, and firms‟ activities; the focus of inquiry is how players 
choose to act under certain rules.112 The second view does not 
assume the institutions as a given at all—instead, the rules are 
agreed upon by the players themselves and can be changed 
based on their pressures, preferences, and biases.113 The first 
 
110. Clay Shirky quotes publisher Tim O‟Reilly calling social networks 
“an architecture of participation.” Shirky, supra note 76, at 17. 
111. Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the 
Three New Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936, 951 (1996), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x/pdf 
(noting that “[a]nyone who has waited at a traffic light when no-one else was 
around, however, has to admit that there are dimensions to the relationship 
between institutions and actions that may not be highly instrumental or well-
modeled by rational choice theories.”). 
112. Under this view, Kenneth Shepsle says that institutions are taken 
“as exogenous constraints, or as an exogenously given game form.” Shepsle, 
supra note 89, at 24. 
113. Id.; see generally, THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 
(1960) (discussing “focal” institutional arrangements). 
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view describes a more specific, formal, structured institution, 
like a government agency, a nonprofit organization, or a body 
of law. The second view describes a conceptual, unstructured 
institution, such as the press or the aggregated efforts of 
advocacy organizations.114 
Unstructured institutions are not established in any 
formal sense; they emerge when parties‟ behavior is affected or 
channeled by others‟ behavior and the demands and pressures 
that the behavior creates. Under this theory, institutions are 
changeable sets of norms that all or most people involved agree 
upon; there are no rules per se, but actors behave as if there 
are because they act strategically in response to their 
expectations of others‟ behavior and other factors in the 
environment. When expectations of behavior become 
particularly clear and become less temporary, then this 
behavior starts to look like an institution. This sort of 
institution is a sort of equilibrium of behavior which, although 
subject to change, is an identifiable pattern.115 
 
2. Why is Civic Social Networking an Unstructured 
Institution, and Why Should it Matter? 
 
The behavior patterns and pressures discussed in sections 
III.B and III.C indicate that civic social networks constitute an 
emerging unstructured institution because they describe not 
 
114. Shepsle uses the terms “structured” and “unstructured” 
institutions. Shepsle, supra note 89, at 27-32. Of course, there are as many 
ways to think about institutions as there are people who want to think about 
institutions. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 111, at 949 (“If rational choice 
theorists often posit a world of individuals or organizations seeking to 
maximize their material well-being, sociologists frequently posit a world of 
individuals or organizations seeking to define and express their identity in 
socially appropriate ways . . . [S]ociological institutionalists argue that 
organizations often adopt a new institutional practice, not because it 
advances the means-ends efficiency of the organization, but because it 
enhances the social legitimacy of the organization or its participants.”). 
115. Shepsle, supra note 89, at 24-25 (noting the importance of Calvert 
and Schotter to this second conception). See generally Randall L. Calvert, 
Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions, in EXPLAINING SOCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 57 (Jack Knight & Itai Sened eds., 1995); Andrew Schotter, THE 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1981). 
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just the use of a new communication tool, but a set of strategic 
behaviors and pressures. Those behaviors and pressures are 
critical to understand for local governments attempting to 
regulate public officials‟ use of civic social networks. 
Not all the “rules” of civic social networking are provided 
by the public officials and constituents; of course, the structure 
and the features of the software itself establish constraints on 
behavior.116 But the existence of such third-party rules does not 
limit the voluntariness or strategic nature of the parties‟ 
activity. This is especially true given the many different social 
networking options available.117 
The recognition of the institutional nature of civic social 
networks is not just an exercise in labeling, but rather has 
significant implications for policymakers seeking to regulate 
public officials‟ use of those networks. Civic social networking 
is not just another tool to which the existing laws may apply, 
like email or text messaging; rather, it is an environment that 
has an impact on the behavior of the actors surrounding it.118 
The interdependent strategic behaviors of public officials 
and constituents in civic social networks guarantee, for 
example, that there will always be a strong incentive for a 
public official to join social networks, but that such an 
incentive will lag behind constituent adoption of the social 
network site unless the public official takes on the burden of 
the political entrepreneur. Similarly, there will be strong 
incentives for public officials to engage in some actual 
 
116. For example, to connect to a public official on Facebook, a user must 
list that person as a “friend” or become a “fan” of that official—labels that a 
critical constituent might resist. One constituent testified before the Seattle 
Ethics & Elections Commission that he resented declaring himself a “friend” 
of a public official merely to have access to that official‟s Facebook feed. 
Timothy Burgess, Councilmember, City of Seattle, Speech at the Meeting of 
the Seattle Ethics and Elections Comm. (Dec. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.seattlechannel.org/videos/video.asp?ID=5590985. 
117. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 111, at 945 (“The process of institutional 
creation usually revolves around voluntary agreement by the relevant actors; 
and, if the institution is subject to a process of competitive selection, it 
survives primarily because it provides more benefits to the relevant actors 
than alternate institutional forms.”). 
118. MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS 
AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 10 (2009). 
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interactive behavior on the social network site, lest 
constituents ignore the public official the same way they ignore 
junk mail and unsolicited bulk email (spam). To the extent 
public officials engage in interactive communication, the 
overwhelming incentive is for the public official to display the 
communication to other users so that the maximum exposure is 
achieved for the spent effort. Similarly, constituents engaged in 
civic social networks experience low-threshold group formation 
and organizational tools, as well as a certain incentive for 
acquiring information and sharing it with other users. 
Constituents can frame their civic social network as any 
portion (or no portion) of their overall social network according 
to their preferences. 
Institutions behave differently than mere tools because 
these bargains or strategic behaviors by public officials and 
constituents tend to funnel activity in certain directions. In the 
case of civic social networks, it indicates that transparency and 
accountability will be highly incentivized. 
 
IV. Transparency and Accountability in the New Public 
Square 
 
A. Civic Social Networks Foster Transparency and 
Accountability 
 
Our idealized notion of “the public sphere” conceives of 
public discourse as a deliberative, rational conversation that 
contributes to public policy and the practical structure 
necessary to carry it out. Habermas famously envisioned the 
public sphere as an arena where people collectively form public 
opinion in an environment without the interference of the 
government or the economy.119 Despite the high hopes of some 
early Internet enthusiasts that the web would realize 
Habermas‟s vision of universal access and pure discourse, the 
web‟s record on elevating or deepening discourse is decidedly 
 
119. Jurgen Habermas, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas 
Burger Trans., The MIT Press 1989) (1962). 
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mixed.120 
But if the Internet (including civic social networks) has not 
produced a more reasoned and balanced public debate, then 
consider a narrower and more limited claim: civic social 
networks, by bringing public officials and constituents into an 
open public square, foster government transparency and 
accountability.121 
The metaphor of civic social networks as the “new public 
square” does not aim for the loft of the public sphere; it makes 
no claim to heighten discourse. Rather, its defining feature is 
open space in full view of the public for anyone who wants it. If 
one chooses to enter the public square, one consciously exposes 
oneself to anything else there—music, speech, governance, 
politics. And in particular, those public officials who enter the 
public square do so with much at stake: reputation, familiarity, 
ridicule, and re-election. By entering the public square, 
whether to stand on a soapbox and preach or sit on a bench and 
listen, a public official is engaging in her job, which under even 
a jaded vision of informed democracy involves some 
combination of transparency and accountability. In civic social 
networks, public officials hear from and speak to constituents 
in full view of the online world. Constituents can deliver 
information, opinions, support, and opposition to those officials, 
and constituents can interact with each other, forming groups 
to advance shared interests. The ease with which 
communications from and interactions with public officials are 
available to the public demonstrates that, in this environment, 
the contours of the institution itself make FOIA requests 
obsolete, and includes constituents in the deliberative process 
at a much deeper level than notice of or attendance at a formal 
meeting would. 
The access to information and the tools to hold officials 
accountable is not an accident. The description of the 
institutional environment, supra at sections III.A through 
 
120. See generally Sunstein, supra note 11. 
121. By “transparency,” I mean the ability of any citizen to obtain 
information about what his government is doing or considering doing. By 
“accountability,” I mean the ability of that citizen to affect the actions or 
considerations of the government. 
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III.D, indicates that public officials will be under constant 
pressure for more disclosure, more information, and more 
attention to constituents and groups. The advantages of group 
formation will easily outweigh the obstacles and the incentives 
for public sharing of information and announcements are high. 
 
B. Ejecting Public Officials from the New Public Square 
Reduces Transparency and Accountability 
 
It is particularly perverse, then, that objections to public 
officials‟ use of civic social networks are based on the fear of 
violating open meeting and public records laws. Prohibitions or 
certain limits on the use of civic social networks—that is, 
ejecting public officials from the new public square—would 
result in less public deliberation, fewer publicly accessible 
records, and elimination of valuable tools to hold public officials 
accountable for their actions. 
As discussed in Part II, open meeting, public records, and 
misuse of government resource laws exist in every state, and 
with good reason. The statutes work on two levels. Their 
immediate goals are to make information about what the 
government does and considers accessible, and to ensure that 
government funds are not misused.122 But those immediate 
 
122. See, e.g., Wash. Open Public Meetings Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 
42.30.010 (1971) (“The legislature finds and declares that all public 
commissions, boards, councils, committees, subcommittees, departments, 
divisions, offices, and all other public agencies of this state and subdivisions 
thereof exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of 
this chapter that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be 
conducted openly.”); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 
(1978) (“[t]he basic purpose of [the] FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, 
vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against 
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”). FOIA is 
“often explained as a means for citizens to know „what their government is up 
to.‟” NARA v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171-72 (2004) (quoting DOJ v. Reporters 
Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)); Wash. Public 
Records Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2007) (“The people of this state do 
not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in 
delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide 
what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. 
The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over 
the instruments they have created.”). 
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goals also advance other important aims; making information 
accessible is important, but the information only takes on 
meaning when it is used to hold public officials accountable, or 
to prevent a monopoly on inside information that would give 
some citizens an exclusive advantage other others. Similarly, 
the restrictions on the use of government resources for private 
or political gain have, at one level, a fiscally prudent purpose 
(that is, barring spending that does not advance a legitimate 
purpose of government). However, the more important 
consideration is preventing an environment where a private 
corporation or a campaign can enjoy a limited benefit to the 
exclusion of others. 
Civic social networks advance all of these primary and 
secondary goals. Communications that would go unrecorded 
outside of the new public square (such as a face-to-face 
discussion or a telephone conversation) are not only 
documented but instantly accessible to the public when they 
occur in a civic social network. Attempts to get a public 
official‟s attention to hold her accountable are easily accessible, 
and the threshold expense to organize a group of constituents 
is virtually zero. In short, civic social networks substantially 
improve public access to deliberative discussion and the records 
created by it.123 
Importantly, the use of civic social networks by public 
officials also helps reduce moral hazard associated with hidden 
action. This hazard appears where a strategic agent—the 
public official—may take action that isn‟t observable by the 
principal—the constituency.124 Civic social networks cannot, of 
course, eliminate the many ways that public officials can hide 
actions or statements (for example, in a private conversation), 
but to the extent that communications in the network are 
available to the public, the opportunity for constituents to 
investigate officials‟ actions and statements is greatly 
improved. 
 
123. Communication, after all, is hydraulic—it will flow where it is 
unrestricted. And to bar communication from a forum in which it is 
transparent would only have the effect of hiding such communication from 
public view. 
124. For a more complete discussion, see Shepsle, supra note 89. 
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C. Local Governments Need to Adapt 
 
Where an attempt to apply existing laws to a new 
institutional environment would run counter to the purposes of 
those laws, local policymakers should adapt. It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to prescribe specific adaptations—and I 
expect that it may take some experimentation for local 
governments to arrive at a comprehensive solution, if there is 
one—but the general outlines of a near-term adaptation are 
clear. 
First, local governments can solve the practical problems 
associated with public records statutes. Retention and storage 
of Facebook and Twitter feeds, for example, are no more 
complicated than saving screen shots, web page images, or 
even printing out a paper copy on a routine schedule. 
Inexpensive or free software solutions already exist for most 
such applications. 
Second, policymakers should adopt interpretations of Open 
Meetings statutes (or amend the statutes themselves) to make 
clear what aspects of written communication constitute a 
“meeting.” The twin purposes of open meeting and public 
record statutes overlap significantly and raise interesting 
questions about when the availability of records is sufficient, 
and when actual presence at an exchange of those records is 
necessary. The doctrinal question—resolved by the Virginia 
court by a close analysis of the immediacy of the exchange of 
emails—also involves what we mean by “deliberation” and 
what types of government action trigger meeting requirements. 
But policymakers should ensure that when city 
councilmembers interact with each other or the public in full 
view of a civic social network, but no votes are taken or 
collective decisions are made, the purposes of the open meeting 
statutes are fulfilled to a greater extent than they would be if 
that interaction was barred. 
Third, local governments should recognize that, to the 
extent public officials allow government resources to connect to 
constituent posts (or third-party advertising), the content of 
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that posting and advertising constitutes a limited public forum 
and is not imputed to the government.125 As civic social 
networks are the new public square, the mere presence of 
public officials in the square should not impute authorship of 
all third-party content in the square to the government any 
more than signs on the sidewalk or constituent letters received 
and retained by agencies are imputed to the government. 
Certainly minimal standards of civility can be enforced, as in 
any limited public forum, but forbidding third-party political 
content is neither wise nor practical—and barring public 
officials from civic social networks where such content is 
possible would have the effect of ejecting them from the public 
square. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A revolution is underway, and it is changing the ways that 
constituents and their public officials interact. It is not just a 
change in the tools used—from the letter to the email—but it is 
a change in the methods and incentives and costs that underlie 
that interaction in a more fundamental way. Just as the 
sunshine laws evolved with the ability of government to retain 
and produce information, those laws must again evolve to 
permit public officials and constituents to engage in the new 
public square of civic social networks. 
 
 
 
125. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for 
Public Forums in the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149 
(1998). For a comprehensive analysis of public forum law on civic social 
networks, see Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0 (forthcoming 2011). 
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